Five things to keep in mind about Duterte’s martial law in Mindanao

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte had to cut short a high-profile visit to Russia, as soon as it became clear that the latest violent clashes in Mindanao beckoned the utmost attention of the commander-in-chief.

Fortunately, he still managed to arrange an earlier-than-scheduled meeting with his "favorite hero," Russian strongman Vladimir Putin. Despite Duterte’s premature departure, the two new ‘best friends’ managed to accomplish what they intended to, namely signing 10 major agreements, covering sectors such as defense, nuclear energy, tourism, industrial development, and trade.

Shortly before his departure from Moscow, Duterte declared martial law all over Mindanao, stating, “It will not be any different from what the President Marcos did.” He also warned, particularly the extremist groups laying siege on Marawi and threatening Mindanao, “I'd be harsh.” He later warned about extending it across the country, if and when necessary. To better understand what is at stake, there are five key factors to keep in mind:

• First, there are competing hypotheses on the exact timing and circumstances of the Maute group’s attack on Marawi. From my understanding, it was likely an opportunistic revenge attack. It came shortly after a reported failed raid on the safe house of Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group, a leading IS-affiliate group in Southeast Asia. The extremist group, also known as Islamic State of Lanao, was likely emboldened by the fact that the president and his key cabinet officials were thousands of miles away in Moscow, thus thinking they could take the government by surprise. As the Zamboanga siege experience in 2013 shows, it might take weeks before the situation is fully under control and returned to a semblance of normality.
• Second, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, which was expressly designed to prevent the emergence of another Marcosian regime, allows martial law only in the event of rebellion or/and invasion. It also has in-build safeguards, which call upon the executive branch to submit a report, either in person or in writing, to Congress within 48 hours of declaration. In addition, it is ultimately up to the Supreme Court, upon the request of any concerned citizen, to examine and approve the validity and basis of any Martial Law declaration.
• Third, there seems to be broad support for Duterte’s latest policy. The legislative branch is broadly supportive of the move, showing even little interest in convening a joint session to examine the legal basis of the declaration. This is likely based on an emerging consensus that the situation in Mindanao is getting out of control, thus the government must have sufficient legal leeway to address the crisis head on. In fairness, most experts argue that the Philippines has among the most inflexible legal frameworks in dealing with such crisis, especially when compared to neighboring countries like Malaysia and Singapore. Nonetheless, we are yet to understand why (i) the declaration covers the entirety of Mindanao, not only Marawi and surrounding provinces, and why (ii) the executive branch didn’t resort to milder forms of emergency powers under our constitution. The decision was perhaps based on intelligence vis-à-vis planned coordinated attacks by extremist groups across the entire island.
• Fourth, beyond Duterte’s threateningly colorful rhetoric, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has done a commendable job in reassuring the public against the specter of Marcosian Martial Law. The Department of National Defense (DND), led by Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, immediately released a set of guidelines, which, at least on paper, safeguard the basic civil liberties and political rights of the citizens under the most difficult conditions. This clearly shows that the AFP, which is tasked with defending our constitution, has broadly internalized democratic values under the post-Marcos regime.
• Finally, the government is increasingly painting the situation in Marawi as a case of "invasion," rather than solely rebellion. This is mainly due to reports that foreign fighters were involved in the attack. The "internationalization" of the extremist movement in Mindanao is a chilling reminder of the necessity to not only develop an effective counter-terror cooperation, but to also address the underlying conditions, which facilitate the spread of extremist ideology in the area.

Thus, the Duterte administration should solicit maximum possible support, especially from tried and trusted allies, including the United States, which have high-grade intelligence, advanced equipment and long tradition of interoperability with the AFP. We should also seek assistance from new strategic allies in Asia, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, and Russia. Ultimately, the heart-wrenching humanitarian crisis in Marawi is a symptom of a deeper crisis, which is precisely the lack of just peace in Mindanao. And this is what Duterte should focus on in the foreseeable future.

Prof. Richard Javad Heydarian is GMA News Resident Analyst