5 facts about US assistance in Mindanao

Three weeks into the Battle of Marawi, something important but not entirely surprising happened. The Duterte administration solicited the assistance of America to liberate the besieged city from Islamic State-affiliate groups under the command of the Maute Group.

This was legal, if not Standard Operating Procedure, but obviously not in step with President Rodrigo Duterte’s months-long quest for an “independent” foreign policy, which, to him, means less dependence on America.

Unsurprisingly, the commander-in-chief even denied that he personally sought American assistance, implying that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) made the decision unilaterally (and with his reluctant ex post facto acquiescence).

Half-jokingly, Duterte event lamented, “This is really their sentiment, our soldiers are really pro-American, that I cannot deny.”

There are five key issues to keep in mind when it comes to understanding the role of America in the ongoing operations in Mindanao:

1. Beyond his fiery rhetoric, Duterte hasn’t been entirely opposed to American military assistance in Mindanao. “As we fought together to stay above the enemy, then so we should help each other to address the threats that confront our societies, our region and our world,” said Duterte referring to America in an early April “Day of Bravery” commemoration speech, just weeks before Maute-led attack on Marawi. Yes, Duterte did threaten to kick out American Special Forces positioned in Mindanao last year, but he never followed through in terms of actual policy. This shows that the president is actually pragmatic and realistic about the country’s security needs, even if it means continued reliance on a country he doesn’t seem to have much love for;
2. The United States is involved in the Battle for Marawi, but only to a certain extent. According to the Philippine constitution, foreign troops (i.e., American) are barred against directly participating in combat operations against local armed groups. Nor are they allowed to establish permanent military bases on Philippine soil, thus American troops can only operate on a revolving basis in the country. This is why the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) mentions ‘rotational access’, not permanent access to Philippine bases. Foreign forces can, however, provide training, real-time intelligence and logistical support side-by-side with Philippine troops during combat operations, as long as they are not directly involved on the battlefield;
3. Under a decade-long US$150 million grant program, America provided a new cache of weapons to the Philippines. On June 5, two weeks into the Battle of Marawi, the AFP received large volume of automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and machine guns. According to the US embassy in Manila, the purpose was to “enhance the (Philippine Marines') counter-terrorism capabilities, and help protect (troops) actively engaged in counter-terrorism operations in the southern Philippines.” The US Special Forces have also provided advanced training, technical assistance in terms of operational coordination, and intelligence support for targeted attacks, with special emphasis on avoiding friendly fire and civilian casualties. As  Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Command, told me on the sidelines of a major security summit earlier this month, "We are involved in activities in Mindanao to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines take the fight to ISIS in the Philippines. I think that is a recognition of how important our relationship with the Philippines is…" The AFP has proven relatively competent in open-field and jungle warfare, but urban warfare has proven challenging. This is where the American assistance came into picture, given their extensive experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and (increasingly) in Syria in recent years, not to mention high-grade intelligence and advanced equipment, including drones. After all, Maute and its legion of foreign fighters are also using tactics used by other extremist groups in the Middle East, including usage of improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and snipers; 
4. The Philippines’ counter-terror cooperation with the US has had some success over the past decade. Since 2002, a large contingent of US Special Forces under the Special Operations Command Pacific has provided training, equipment and intelligence to Philippine troops fighting local Islamic extremist groups on the southern island of Mindanao and adjoining areas. Over the subsequent decade, the AFP, with US assistance, managed to eliminate much of the Al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) leadership, contain their expansion, while severely restricting its geographic area of operation. In fact, by 2014, the ASG was broadly viewed, though prematurely, as contained until it resuscitated with new vigor and verge – along with other extremist - under the IS flag and swiftly took advantage of peace process deadlock following the Mamasapano tragedy in 2015. 
5. What about our new best friends, Russia and China? The Battle of Marawi came shortly after Duterte’s back-to-back visits to Beijing and Moscow, part of his broader strategy of diversification and pivoting to the East. In the meantime, these powers can’t provide assistance similar to America, since we have not signed any major bilateral defense agreement, namely a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) or an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which would allow them to provide advanced and large-scale lethal aid. But, nothing stops them from providing useful intelligence (especially in light of concerns over possible participation of Russian Caucasus and even Uighur fighters), free defense equipment, and humanitarian and infrastructure assistance for people of Marawi and other affected areas.

Ultimately, the real battle in Mindanao is not only against extremists and violent rebels, but also against widespread poverty, under-development, and socio-cultural marginalization, which fuels violence, intolerance and conflict.

And this is why we need to get all the help we need, both from our tried-and-tested allies, but also our new beshies. —NB, GMA News