Anti-corruption is messy

Critics of Chief Justice Corona’s impeachment are, for the most part, not defending the CJ’s character.  The guy obviously has skeletons. Instead, PNoy’s interlocutors are concerned with his method: in particular, the “railroading” of the impeachment complaint in the House of Representatives. They want to safeguard institutions like the legislature from the encroachment of a strong executive. Amid this moralizing and indignation, I pose a simple question: did you really think anti-corruption would be pristine in a country like the Philippines? It’s easy to complain about methods, but it’s difficult to offer alternatives. What else could PNoy have done given the urgency of the situation? Some critics claim PNoy should not have interfered in House deliberations on impeachment. This position betrays a naiveté about the interaction between the executive and the legislature. Our system assumes presidential interference with the legislative process. For example, there’s the Legislative Executive Advisory Council (LEDAC), in which the president convenes leaders of both the upper and the lower house precisely to cajole them. And since the president has power of pork, he has the power of persuasion. The “precedent” of a strong executive is not a precedent, but a built-in feature of the system. PNoy is powerful regardless of what he does to Corona. People wary of a strong executive should be talking charter change and not precedent-setting. However, I would also contest that Corona’s impeachment is simply an expression of presidential power. Corona’s impeachment is executive power buttressed by public support. In other words, PNoy has a mandate to run after crooks. He ran and won on a barely-veiled anti-Gloria platform. When congressmen signed the impeachment complaint against CJ, they responded not just to a powerful president, but a popular one. Sure, some of them acted for self-serving reasons. But does that surprise you? Did you think things get done in the Philippines without pandering to politicians? Name me an alternative method that undercuts the role of selfish politicians and I will lobby for your canonization. But why, you ask, did PNoy and his allies have to rush things? Why didn’t the House deliberate longer? This is strange. When we think about justice, we usually equate it with swiftness of action. Justice delayed is justice withheld. And now we complain that things happened too quickly? Give me a break.              Did the naïve critics really think “deliberation” would have changed things? Or are they just concerned about the appearance of delicadeza? I’ll concede that a moro-moro could have strengthened PNoy’s position. But a moro-moro is precisely that: a play.              I’ll tell you what “deliberation” could have done: it could have set GMA free. Corona works quickly; just look at how quickly the SC released a TRO on DOJ’s travel ban against GMA. You criticize the rashness of the impeachment complaint, how about the rashness of the TRO? The more we delay acting against the CJ, the greater the chance a crook will be set free.   But then the hair-splitters opine: Corona is just one person; you are trying to combat the actions of an entire court. So what’s your solution? Target no one because you can’t target all? Would you endorse passivity amidst a wanton abuse of power?              So I continue to ask: what else could PNoy have done given the circumstances? For the president, it’s damned if you do, damned if you don’t. If GMA were set free because PNoy didn’t run after Corona immediately, people would have complained about a miscarriage of justice. Amidst my Machiavellian musings on political strategy, I am actually drawing on a greater moral imperative that trumps the myopic objections discussed above: the need for justice. Ensuring that Arroyo goes to jail is the best political precedent we, as a people, can set in our struggle against corruption. Anti-corruption, despite its messiness, is ultimately about the strengthening of institutions. The greatest damage to the institution of the Supreme Court is allowing someone like Corona to continue politicizing it. The greatest damage to the institution of the presidency will occur if we allow a criminal president to get off scot-free. Those who support Corona’s impeachment are also thinking about institutions. But we do so with the larger picture in mind.    _____________________ Leloy Claudio is an Instructor in Political Science at the Ateneo de Manila University. He completed doctoral studies at the School of Historical Studies, the University of Melbourne.