New hope for a possible signing of a peace agreement between the GPH and MILF within 2012 rises to a new stage with guarded exhilaration post the latest talks in Kuala Lumpur.  The 10 – point ‘decision points’ between the GPH and MILF, though couched in ‘generalities’, lay new concrete and specific ‘landmarks’ that point to a growing agreement between the two peace panels.

The first notable landmark is the understanding and ‘acceptance’ by both sides of establishing a ‘new autonomous regional entity’ that would take the place of the ARMM post political settlement.  Though this may still take some time, both the concept as well as a new autonomous set up vice the ARMM is NOW an accepted fact.  

With this new concept, it seems that the ambiguity as well as the ‘objection’ to the former concept of ‘sub-state’ and the often misunderstood concept of ‘asymmetrical relation between the sub state and the national government have been transcended.  It seems that the fear of partition or secession has been overcome by simply inserting the word ‘autonomous’ to the so called ‘new political entity’.  To some, it may look like a question of semantics, but the simple addition of that adjective makes a lot of difference.  It dispels all ambiguities about the political status of the said emerging political entity.

The second landmark is the unanimity of recognizing the need not only of transitional phase but also the transitional mechanism to bridge the present ARMM to that ‘new autonomous political entity’.  When and how long this transitional phase takes effect and what would be the form of the ‘transitional mechanism’ are still subjects of negotiation.  But the good news is the forward and positive movement in the peace talks which for a while has been reported to be in near collapse.

The third landmark is the agreement to truly empower the ‘new autonomous political entity’.  The Basic Law or the new Organic Act that would create the said ‘autonomous political entity’ would clearly spell the competence and jurisdiction of the new political entity over local affairs.  In the same breath, the Basic Law would spell out also the competence of the national government.  While the Basic Law would be enacted by Congress, hopefully, it shall adhere both to the spirit and the letter of the political settlement set in the peace agreement.

There are two lessons in the past when the legislations that operationalized the peace agreement remain contested.  The first case is PD 1618 creating the two Autonomous Regions IX and XII issued by President Ferdinand Marcos to implement the 1976 Peace Agreement.  The second case is RA 9054 to implement the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GPH and the MNLF.  In both cases, the MNLF continue to object to the unilateral and arbitrary implementation of the peace agreements.  This is the reason that the two peace agreements between the GPH and the MNLF have never been brought to a closure.  The disagreements continue to pester the full implementation of the said final peace agreement.

Lessons in the past are bitter and painful.  They lead to a non-ending recrimination on both parties.  The two sides are fully aware of the inadequacies, gaps and ambiguities in ‘legislating’ peace agreements. At times, the negotiation on the implementation of the peace agreement proves more daunting than the actual negotiation of a peace agreement.  In fact, the devil in any peace agreement is in the detail of implementing the said agreement.  The task of reconstruction and building trust post agreement is far more difficult than negotiating the peace agreement itself.

No doubt, the GPH and MILF peace panels need to put all their ingenuity and creativity together coupled with the commitment and political will of the still popular President to make Congress deliver in full (walang tawad) the agreed political settlement through the enactment of an empowering Basic Law that is faithful to the GPH and MILF peace agreement.

With these ten decision points now mutually agreed and accepted, the task is to translate them to a doable or ‘implementable’peace agreement that ensures a genuine political settlement.  If the agreement is signed within 2012, there would be three years of transition and part of the said transition is the assurance of the enactment of a Basic Law that is faithful to the peace agreement.  The three to four years transition would make a lot of difference given the commitment and the political will of the President to bring closure to the Moro Liberation Front.  

In the likelihood of a political settlement with the MILF, there would again be a new transition – bridging the present ARMM to the “new autonomous political entity’.  The transitional phase and the transitional mechanism would be in place either parallel to the ARMM or taking the place of the ARMM during the transition until the new Basic Law is ratified and implemented.