Has Comelec failed to meet its own poll automation schedule?

If one were to judge how the Comelec is doing on automation based on its original schedule of activities, Comelec would be turning in a failing performance. According to that schedule, delivery of the PCOS – the Precinct Count Optical Scanner – machines and the systems should have taken place between Nov. 11 and Nov. 16; the testing of these systems and machines should have started on Nov. 17; the field test should have taken place on Nov. 25, and if a second field test had been deemed necessary, it should have taken place by Dec. 5, so that Mock Elections could have been held on Dec. 12. That was the original schedule. And none of those events have taken place as yet. Of course, we know why: problems among the contractors delayed the approval and signing of the contract, and the notice to proceed was delayed by one and a half months. So, the Comelec prepared a revised timeline last Oct. 10, which is posted on its website. How is it doing, if we use this timeline as a basis for judgment? I'm afraid, not so good either. According to that schedule, delivery of 12,000 PCOS machines should have taken place by last month, and 30,000 machines this month. Instead, after two pilot runs conducted between October 15 and Nov 14, a "pre-production" run produced 120 units, and 100 of them, which will be used as training units, will be delivered "soon" (this from an email dated Nov. 26). But the Comelec is apparently still sanguine. Per the ICT consultant, production would have started in earnest at the beginning of this month, and the factory in China is capable of producing 3,000 machines per shift per day –supposedly 10 minutes to produce a machine. But then the picture is spoiled when he also says that 83,000 PCOS will be produced in less than 60 days. Less than 60 days? Can we do the arithmetic? If 3,000 machines can be produced per shift, then it should take either slightly more than nine days to slightly less than 14 days to produce 83 thousand units, depending on whether two or three shifts a day are being used. You know, even if only one shift were employed, it would take slightly more than 27 days! So why are they talking less than 60 days? Unless of course, they expect a very large rejection rate as far as quality control is concerned. Or, the ICT consultant cannot do simple arithmetic. Either way, I am not reassured. Unfortunately the Comelec and its partners have become very defensive, and tend to label people who ask questions as obstructionist and sourgraping – as if we don't want automated elections to succeed. Of course we do. But the higher priority is that the elections itself must succeed – whether automated or not. So at the risk of being called obstructionist, there are some very important questions that must be asked the Comelec: Number 1: Given the delays in the automated election system, at what point in time is Comelec going to evaluate whether complete automation can no longer be achieved, and fall back on Plan B? And what is Plan B? Even assuming that the automated election system pushes through, there are many more ways in which cheating can take place. Therefore, what is Comelec doing about implementing the safeguards that it promised, and the safeguards provided for in the election law (RA 9369). Let me just name a few of these safeguards: a) RA 9369 provides that "Once an AES or automated election system technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof." What is so important about a source code? Well, it is the set of instructions to the computer on its basic operations and on what to do with the election data in accordance with Philippine election laws. Who gives the instructions? The programmer, provided by Smartmatic. That's why those instructions should be subject to review. b) another safeguard provided by RA 9369 is a random manual precinct audit – the election results of one precinct chosen at random in each congressional district will be tallied manually to validate the machine tally. And if there is a discrepancy (possibly indicating that the machine had been tampered with), that would signal that the rest of the precincts should be tallied manually too something is wrong. There are other safeguards, this time promised by Comelec: that the PCOS would provide a voter verified paper trail so that the voter could be assured that his vote was recorded properly; another safeguard the PCOS would be designed to inform the voter why his ballot was rejected, if it was rejected. None of these safeguards have been implemented so far. In sum, I am willing to attribute to Comelec the best of intentions. But it must also be reminded that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.