The shifting MNLF politics (Part 3)

 

Many are wondering why we suddenly woke up to a tragic peace breakdown, when people thought that the MNLF issues had already been settled. The first shock came with the declaration of Independence by the MNLF, sometime around the end of August. Then this declaration was followed by series of flag-raising rituals. The last one in Zamboanga ended in tragedy.

 

The city was shut down for 20 days. The decision to evict the MNLF forces by an all-out military assault resulted in gargantuan destruction previously unknown in Zamboanga City. There were about 200 dead, 120,000 displaced people and about 10,000 houses destroyed. Zamboanga City's image as an investment center of Western Mindanao is in tatters!

 

Many ask what happened. Is the MNLF not a partner of the Philippine government in peace and development in Southern Philippines, that began in September 1996 when the Final Peace Agreement was signed? That peace agreement was painstakingly negotiated for four years. I believe the issues of the MNLF adequately addressed.

 

To appreciate the shifting politics of the MNLF, there is a need to re-visit the past. 
 

In the early 70s, the MNLF fought a separatist war seeking to establish an independent Bangsamoro Republic. It was a ‘ferocious’ separatist war that scarred the peoples of Southern Philippines - both Muslims and Christians alike. The political fault lines (Martial Law and Traditional Politics) were exacerbated by the religious and ethnic divides that added a flavor of "fanaticism" from both sides of the divide.

What started as skirmishes between the "Blackshirts" (Muslims) and "Ilagas" (Christians) ended in a full-scale war that engaged nearly two-thirds of the entire Armed Forces, the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and the Integrated National Police. 

 

The peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and the MNLF began in earnest at the behest of the powerful Organization of the Islamic Conference, following the worldwide oil squeeze and embargo of 1973. The framework for the negotiation was a grant of substantial autonomy for the 13 provinces and all cities therein in the Southern Philippines. The whole peace deal was done under the sponsorship of the Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi in 1976. 

 

The 1976 Tripoli Agreement was a radical change for the MNLF's politics. It saw the transformation of its policies from a separatist war to a struggle for genuine autonomy for the 13 provinces and all the cities therein and within the "constitutional processes" of the Republic of the Philippines.

The exhilarating, joyous signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement did NOT last long. When the agreement was brought home to the Philippines, President Marcos began implementing it unilaterally. 

 

The MNLF's separatist politics had been seriously "compromised" by their acceptance of the OIC formula that sought a grant of full autonomy and NOT a separatist or secessionist war.  It could be said that from 1976 onward, the MNLF politics have always been a struggle for the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. This was the framework used in the short-lived peace process between the MNLF and the Cory Administration in 1986-1987. 

 

The Cory administration abandoned negotiations with the MNLF with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. What it did was simply to implement the provisions of the Constitution that refer to the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera (Article X).

 

Then, in 1992, with Fidel Ramos assuming the Presidency, his government began the policy of peace negotiation with all rebel fronts. Once again, the peace negotiation began with the MNLF using 1976's Tripoli Agreement as framework. The popular "battle cry" in 1993 was "full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement both in letter and spirit" (1993 Ciphanas Agreement between the GRP and the MNLF).

 

After three years of painstaking negotiation, the Final Peace Agreement came about on September 2, 1996 (initialled at the Merdeka Palace by Ambassador Yan for the Philippines and MNLF Chair Nur Misuari in the presence of Indonesian President Suharto and the OIC Secretary General on August 29, 1996).

 

In short, the MNLF's politics have radically shifted from a separatist struggle to genuine autonomy within the framework of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. In 1996, the Philippine Government and the MNLF finally settled and agreed on the meaning of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement as it is now contained in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement that is "full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement both in letters and spirit." What should have followed during the transitional phase was the full legislation of the 1996 Final Peace Accord by Congress. Congress legislated RA 9054 without the help of neither the MNLF nor the two Transitional Bodies: The SPCPD and the 81-member Consultative Assembly.

 

As in any peace agreement, the real devil is NOT in the signing of the Peace Accord but in the IMPLEMENTATION of the said Peace Accord. From day one, there has been wrangling on the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement. But President Ramos was assisted by real professionals who helped his administration navigate the turbulent waters of this implementation with great, adept ease.

 

When President Estrada took the helm of government in 1998, he really did NOT know what to do about the implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement. The whole experiment and the ARMM went on "auto-pilot" of the sort both for the Special Zone of Peace and Development with its two transitional bodies (Council and Assembly) and for the ARMM, as well. Moreover, by the year 2000, President Estrada went on an aggressive mode and he declared an all-out war against the MILF that his government labelled as a "Terrorist Front." 

 

The enabling law of the Final Peace Agreement was already in the making during the last days of President Ramos's tenure, and in the early years of PGMA. Congress finally passed Republic Act 9054 in 2001. The new law, RA 9054, was submitted to PGMA for her signature. PGMA knew that the said law was concocted by Congress alone, notwithstanding the strong objection of the MNLF - the partner in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. She did not know what to do, so she did NOT sign the law, merely allowing it to "lapse into law" by the inaction of the Executive. 

 

With the ratification of the new law, RA 9054, that amended the Cory Autonomy Law - RA 6734, and the subsequent elections in the ARMM, the Philippine government believed that it had fully complied with the requirement of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The transitional phase or phase one of the implementation of the peace agreement was over.

 

The MNLF's Chairman, Maas Nur Misuari, however believed that the whole process of the "government implementation" of the 1996 Peace Agreement has always been unilateral and arbitrary. He rejected the whole exercise and declared the status quo as "violations of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement." The first sign of the ‘rebellion’ was the brief occupation of the ARMM Cabatangan Complex in Zamboanga City in 2001. This was peacefully negotiated. The hostages were freed, and the MNLF went back to their camps.

 

Chairman Nur and his forces went back to Sulu and there renewed their struggle. The relentless military attacks and bombardment of Chairman Nur’s enclaves forced him to go to Malaysia with the idea of moving to the Middle East to lead, once again, their Separatist War from the outside.

This plan was aborted when PM Mahathir arrested him in Sabah and handed him back to PGMA in a silver platter. At what price? Some analysts at that time and MNLF leadership opined that the price was North Borneo.

 

So, from 2001, the MNLF went back to being rebels. Then, in 2006, the wind shifted again and, this time, through the mediation of the OIC, the MNLF and the Philippine Government went back to the negotiating table.

This time, the three (Philippine Government, MNLF and OIC) agreed to seriously REVIEW the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with a view to bridging the gaps that continue to divide the MNLF and the Philippine Government.

This is now called the Tripartite Review. The GPH and the MNLF have identified about 43 gaps between the RA 9054 and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The two parties have reached consensus in all but three substantial issues - 1) Territory; 2) Strategic Mineral; and 3) Transitional Phase.

(Next: The GPH Politics vis-à-vis Chairman Nur)