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Defective from the start, BOI calls Mamasapano mission


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(UPDATED 3:45 p.m.) Oplan Exodus, the mission that eventually led to the Jan. 25 Mamasapano clash, "was defective from the very beginning," the PNP Board of Inquiry said in its report.
 
The BOI findings, released on Friday, said the mission, supposedly to serve arrest warrants against wanted international terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan and known bomb-maker Abdul Basit Usman, "[could] never be executed effectively."
 
In its report's executive summary, the BOI primarily blamed the PNP's lack of coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and "the peace mechanism entities" in the turnout of the mission.
 
It also cited the following factors:
 
* troop movement was mismanaged
* troops failed to occupy their positions
* there was lack of effective communication among the operating troops
* command and control was ineffective.

According to the BOI, the mission planning of Oplan Exodus was defective due to: (1) poor analysis of the area of operation; (2) unrealistic assumptions; (3) poor intelligence estimate; (4) absence of abort criteria; (5) lack of flexibility in its CONOPS; (6) inappropriate application of TOT; and (7) absence of prior coordination with the AFP and AHJAG
 
The following factors affected the execution of CONOPS: (1) mismanaged movement plan from staging area to Vehicle Drop-Off Point; (2) failure to occupy the designated way points; (3) ineffective communication system among the operating troops; (4) unfamiliarity with the terrain in the area of operation; (5) non-adherence to operational/tactical Standard Operating Procedures; (6) lack of situational awareness among commanders; and (6) breakdown in the command and control.

Time-on-target not acceptable
 
The BOI report said time-on-target coordination, a plan proposed by and eventually carried out by sacked PNP Special Action Force chief Dir. Getulio Napeñas Jr., "[did] not conform to the established and acceptable operational concepts and protocols of the PNP.
 
The said concept "is applicable only to ordinary police operations," the report said, adding: "Even AFP commanders asserted that the TOT (time-on-target) concept is alien to the Armed Forces and runs counter to their established SOPs."
 
"It appears that Napeñas' primary consideration for adopting the TOT concept was operational security to reduce the risk of having Oplan Exodus compromised," the BOI said.

However, Napeñas failed to consider the consequences of the TOT concept vis-a-vis the required mitigating actions. He appeared to have relied heavily on the verbal commitment of the suspended (PNP chief Dir. Gen. Alan) Purisima to arrange for the needed AFP support."
 
AFP, peace mechanism
 
It further said that artillery fire support "was not delivered when needed" because the AFP took the peace process into consideration. 
 
"AFP demanded prior coordination to enable them to react and deliver the requested support," it said. "Nonetheless, the AFP sent infantry and mechanized units to reinforce the SAF. White phosphorus artillery rounds were fired late in the afternoon, However, by then, all of the 55th SAC (Special Action Company) lay dead except for one who was able to escape."
 
It also pointed out that peace process mechanisms "were not observed" during both planning and execution of the mission.
 
It said that the peace mechanism, "when tapped by AFP, did their best to reinstate the ceasefire" between government troops and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 
 
However, it was delayed by participation of other armed groups such as the MILF splinter group Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and other armed civilians.
 
'Defective' equipment
 
The BOI report also pointed out defects in some of the equipment used by the SAF troopers during the mission and subsequent clash.
 
"Some of the ordnance for M203 were defective. Although there were sufficient rounds of ammunition for each operating troop, the overwhelming strength of the enemy caused the troops to run out of ammunition," it said.
 
It added that the Motorola handheld radios "failed when submerged in water" as it was "not designed for military-type of operations." It also had short battery life "because of wear and tear."
 
It also said that the mobile phones used as a primary mode of communication during the operation eventually "fell short of what were needed to relay real-time information and coordination of activities to and from the chain of command."
 
It added that the 55th SAC and the 84th Seaborne lost contact via radio "during the crucial moments" of the operation, when they "had to rely on distinctive gunfire to approximate each other's location." —NB, GMA News