FULL TEXT: Command responsibility and the commanders responsible in Mamasapano 

Full text of the Philippine National Police-Board of Inquiry report on command responsibility and the officials responsible in the Mamasapano incident.
 

Command and responsibility is another principle that goes with the principle of chain of command.

Executive order No. 226 dated february 15, 1995 signed by former President Fidel Ramos, entitled, “institutionalization of the doctrine of command responsibility in all government offices, particularly at all levels of command in the Philippine National Police and other law enforcement agencies” highlights the need for strict and effective management and control of an organization by the supervisor as critical in ensuring the responsive delivery of the services by the government, especially in police matters. 
 

Emphasis should be given to the phrase all government offices under the executive branch of government.

The PNP Fundamental Doctrine Manual states that: “The commander is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. This responsibility can never be delegated otherwise it would constitute an abdication of his role as a commander. He alone answers the success or failure of his command in all circumstances."
 

The PNP Ethical Doctrine Manual states that: “Command Resposibility – In accordance with the doctrine on command responsibility, immediate commanders/ directors shall be responsible for the effective supervision, control and direction of their personnel and shall see to it that all government  resources shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance with laws and regulations and safeguard against losses thru illegal or improper disposition.” 

Officers with command responsibility

Discussed below are the officers with command responsibility in relation to Oplan Exodus.

The Director SAF
 

Based on the accounts of those who participated in the mission planning process of Oplan Exodus, Director Getulio Napeñas was responsible for the tactical aspect of the operation.

President Benigno Aquino III during the press briefing on January 28, 2015, also affirmed that Napeñas was the officer responsible for the tactical concept of the operation.

While Napeñas allowed opposing and critical views from his subordinates, records indicate that he heavily influenced the discussion and planning of Oplan Exodus and selected the way-in/way-out infiltration and exfiltration of troops; and, by “foot-and-night-only” concept of operations (CONOPS).

During his interview with the Board of Inquiry (BOI), it appeared that his appreciation of Oplan Exodus was that it was a high-risk mission and a “must-be-delivered” task. At one point, he mentioned with the BOI that he anticipated that the SAF would incur at least ten (10) casualties.

It is also worthy to note that during interviews with BOI, Senate and House of Representatives hearings, among others, DSAF willingly admitted that he was responsible for Oplan Exodus.

 

Napeñas on receiving and forwarding inaccurate information

Pursuant to Oplan Exodus, Napeñas would be supported by technical intelligance experts who would be monitoring the ground station. As events unfolded, Napeñas failed to report accurate and timely information to OIC-PNP.

At about 01:24pm of January 25,2015, OIC-PNP Espina sent a short messaging system (SMS or Text) message to Napeñas: “Relayed to rusty. Bakit may balitang 11 na ang patay sa SAF?”

Almost two minutes after that text message, Napeñas replied, “Sir, di confirm yan, ang report tao nila wounded meron pero wala pa patay Sir”.
 

The reply Napeñas may have made OIC-PNP Espina believe that SAF commandos still had the advantage. It seemed that Napeñas already knew what happened to the members of 55th Special Action Company (SAC) when OIC-PNP Espina made an inquiry.

An interview with radio operator Police Officer 3 Lloyd Tano Ensoy (who was directly responsible for communication between 55th Special Action Company (SAC) and tactical command post (TCP) revealed that by 01:00pm., Napeñas heard Police Senior Inspector John Garry Erana shouting over the radio communication system that 55th SAC was already overwhelmed and flooded by gunfire.

According to Ensoy, Erana shouted over the radio: “Mauubos na kami dito.” Thereafter, there was radio silence. During the radio silence, Ensoy attempted to contact Erana but the was no longer any response through the radio.
 

It is likely that Napeñas, a seasonsed combat officer, could infer from the radio communication of Erana and the succeeding radio silence as to what the situation of the 55th SAC was on the ground. However, despite that radio communication at 01:00pm., Napeñas texted OIC-PNP at around 01:26pm. that SAF only had wounded personnel.

Due to inaccurate information from Napeñas, quick and appropriate counteractions were not made. The misleading information and the seeming lack of urgency on the part of Napeñas could have prevented OIC-PNP to take urgent action. 

Based on the standard pratice in the conducting military operations, communications conducted through text message exchanges do not connote urgency to respond or react. The act of typing text messages indicates that the sender has enough time to construct the message and to wait for the recipient to reply at his available time. In the case of the Mamasapano incident, Napeñas relayed messages to OIC-PNP Espina through SMS message which took more time and effort to deliver and had the risk of leading to misunderstanding and confusion.

 

The suspended CPNP
 

All the power and authority vested in PDG Purisima as CPNP ceased to exist on the day of his suspension order was served.

This was stressed by Senator Miriam Santiago in one of the Senate hearings, to quote: “You’re placed on preventive suspension on december 19, 2014. 'Suspension' is defined by the law dictionary as 'Temporary deprivation of a person’s powers or priviledges, especially public officers.’ Hindi lang powers ang na-cut off or ang functions, pati pa ang privileges. Kaya kung tutuusin, noong period of preventive suspension, you should not even have been allowed to live in the White House, and yet, you continue to participate in preparation for a law enforcement activity. Therefore, sir, I humbly call to your attention. In jurisprudence, you ovestepped your limits."
 

On December 16, 2014, the OIC-PNP issued Special Order No. 9851 which directed suspended CPNP Alan Purisima and other suspended PNP officers, to “cease and desist from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency of (their respective cases filed by the Ombudsman) until its termination.”
 

Records show that suspended CPNP Purisima participated in the communications and discussions relating to Oplan Exodus inspite of his suspension. A “de facto chain of command” seemed to have been created when, during his suspension, PDG Purisima communicated and reported directly to the President and continued to give advice, instructions and directions to Napeñas with respect to Oplan Exodus.

There are indications that supended CPNP purisima was not merely acting in an advisory capacity. For instance, he expressly assumed responsibility for certain aspects of Oplan Exodus such as when he assured that AFP support would be provided.

Even if PDG Purisima was suspended, his actions indicate that he was asserting and exercising command responsibility in relation to Oplan Exodus.

PDG Purisima’s inaccurate and misleading information

According to National Crisis Management Core Manual (NCMCM) 2012, the Situational Awareness (SA) process primarily aimed at strategically preventing a crisis formally begins by scanning the environment for risks and vulnerabilities or indicators of potential crisis.

The SA shall provide attributions for, and evaluation of, all references and sources, information is then depicted into several variables such as; movements, structures processes, phenomena, ideas, or belief systems whose dynamics, decisions, behavior, power, inclinations, tendencies, directions, etc., can determine a certain outcome or change.

At a crucial stage of the crisis, suspended CPNP Purisima kept providing inaccurate and ambiguous information from unreliable sources, which resulted in eventual erroneous decisions.

On January 25, 2015, around 07:57am., suspended CPNP Purisima sent a text message to Lieutentant General Rustico Guererro stating that: “Bok text sa aking ng dir saf… Sir location of SAF troops GC 68006 65717 and 6823465956.Nasa paligid ng first GC ang mga kalaban & tuloy pa rin heavy firefighth. Napindown tropa sa first GC at meron mga casualties sila. Baka puede artillery support sa AFP”.

Guerrero replied at around 08:03am.: “Meron ng coordination sa ground tank and artillery support are made available.”
 

The foregoing exchange of messages indicate that when Guerrero texted suspended CPNP Purisima about support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Guerrero referred only to the availability of the support elements on the ground. Guerrero did not clarify that its disposal was dependent on the ground commander-whether or not he would allow the use or deployment of the avilable support elements. 

Even if the response was ambiguous, suspended CPNP Purisima failed to clarify its deployment by, for instance, calling Guerrero.

The lackadaisical stance can also be gleaned from the statement of suspended CPNP Purisima to Guerrero in the same text message at 07:57a.m.: “Baka puede artillery support sa AFP."

Such statement does not connote a sense of urgency as it seemingly gave Guerrero a choice to either send support artillery to the battle zone, or not, Prudence would have required suspended CPNP Purisima to take quick action and give clear, decisive instructions. However, the suspende CPNP failed to do the same.
 

Furthermore, the exchanges of text messages between suspend CPNP Purisima and President Aquino reveal that the former provided inaccurate information.

The President texted, “If I remember correctly, 160 SAF troopers were directly involved in this operation plus provisions for other PNP and AFP units to assist. The terrain is flat and clear as opposed to upland forested or jungle terrain. Why could they not contain and/or overwhelm the 15-20 member opposing force? Are they still in contact with the two other targets? If not, and the opposing force has escaped, are we now back to square one?”
 

Suspended CPNP Purisima replied, “they are presently in contact with the reinforcing elements from the BIFF. The containment forces are the ones in contact right now. They are supported by the mechanized and artillery support, Sir.”
 

He further added, “the local target Basit and his group were the first group that were engaged by main effort group.”
 

The President replied, “review your earlier and latest texts. They differ as to which was engaged first.”

The text messages of suspended CPNP Purisima to the President were erroneous. Such messages confused the President as to which group engaged with the SAF troops."

Also, the artillery support that suspended CPNP Purisima mentioned was actually not present in the area. His failure to provide accurate information to the President may have made the President complacent about the ground situation.

As around 09:45 a.m., suspended CPNP Purisima texted Napeñas: “nagbigay ng directive order MILF central comm., wlang MILF pwde lumapit sa ongoing PNP opns in mamasapano Sir, yong nagresist mga tao ni mahamadali tambato and basit usman wd wanted politician Sir, mahina pwersa nila, mabuti nagadvise ka kasi mem MILF gusto magsali pina pull out sila ngaun.”

The suspended CPNP added, “txt ng contact ko sa milf”.
 

Suspended CPNP Purisima informed Napeñas about the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) activity when he texted around 11:19 am.: “I asked our contact where will they withdraw direction, His reply…Going to marsh area Sir, merin ibang tropa, nakaharang sa daanan nila, ingatan ng tropa mga arm groups ng roque politicians s baba banda ng Mamasapano, more or less 100 armado nakaposition.”

The above-qouted text messages of suspended CPNP Purisima contatined information from a contact in the MILF. However, there is nothing in the records which show whether he was able to verify the veracity or reliability of his source. On the other hand, there are indications that his contact from the MILF provided false or tainted information.

The text message citing information from suspended CPNP Purisima’s MILF contact stated that the adversarial force was weak, when in fact the actual events on the ground contradicted this statement.

Prior to dissemination, suspended CPNP Purisima should have verified his source of information or ensured that the details being provided to him were accurate and  reliable. As an experienced Intelligence Officer, he should have first evaluated or ensured a manner of evaluating the information prior to disssemination. In this case, the information received by Napeñas from suspended CPNP Purisima appears to have contributed to the missapreciation by the former ot the situation.

The BOI notes that based on the transcript of text messages attached by suspended CPNP Purisima to his affidavit, most of his text messages to the President do not indicate the time when such were sent or received. This limits the ability of the BOI to establish the timelines of the messages, and their significance and/or impact vis-avis the chronology of events or situation on the ground.

 

The SILG and OIC-PNP

The secretary of the interior and local government (SILG) Mar Roxas and OIC-PNP Espina, in his capacity as deputy Chief PNP for Operations (DCO), were present during a briefing by Napeñas held sometime in March 2014 in Camp Crame about a special project to take down high value targets (HVTs) (Oplan Wolverine). However, both of them were kept in the dark throughout the planning process of Oplan Exodus.

The OIC-PNP, or in his capacity as DCO, was never consulted for approval before the concept of Oplan exodus was presented to the President. There was no opportunity for the OIC PNP to inform the SILG about plan Exodus, as he himself was taken out of the loop.

OIC-PNP was first informed about Oplan Exodus through a phone call by suspended CPNP Purisima at 05:50 am on January 25, 2015 that the mission to get the HVT’s pushed through. On the other hand, SILG learned about the operation when he got an SMS message from Police Director Charles Calima Jr. at 07:43am.

The President as the Commander-in-Chief

Certain statements made during the press briefing of the President on January 28, 2015 appear to conflict with other statements.

At one point during the press briefing, the President stated that he was on top of the hunt for Marwan and company for several months. The President also denied the involvement of suspended CPNP Purisima in Oplan Exodus. However, in the succeeding Senate hearings, suspended CPNP Purisima admitted that he was accountable for Oplan Exodus.

In the  same press briefing, when the President was asked for a categorical answer if he gave the go-signal for Oplan Exodus, The President did not directly address the question and replied that the question was rethorical. He further said “tinutulungan ako ni General Purisima.”

On March 9, 2015, the President said during his press briefing in Malacañang that he approved Oplan Exodus. The President specifically stated: “kung alam ko na ganito ang gagawin niya (Napeñas) from the start, ay hinindian ko ho itong misyon na ito…” and “kung alam ko ho  ‘yung parte ng planong yon, palagay ko ho hindi na natin inapprove.”

During his interview with BOI, Napeñas narrated that the input of the President was focused more in the details of the operational and tactical plan for Oplan Exodus. This was supported by text messages that the President sent to suspended CPNP Purisima that contatined details of Oplan Exodus while the encounter was on-going on January 25, 2015, to qoute: “If I remember correctly, 160 SAF troopers are involved in this operation plus provisions for other PNP and AFP units to assist.

The terrain is flat and clear as opposed upland, forested or jungle terrain. Why could they not contain and/or ovewhelm the 15-20 opposing force? Are they still in contact with the two targets? If not and the opposing force has escaped? Are we now back to square one?”

Another SMS that the President sent to suspended CPNP Purisima on January 25, 2015, stated: Why was it left behind? The other two targets?”

The SMS messages show that the President had knowledge of the details of Oplan Exodus.

From the standpoint of military operations, the President’s questions might be construed as tactical orders for the ground commander to follow, i.e., “why was it left behind? The other two targets?”

According to Napeñas, during the presentation of Oplan Exodus on January 09, 2015, the President gave instruction to coordinate with the AFP. When Napeñas responded that:  “with all due respect Sir, compromised po ang AFP. Planning and Preparation stages during big operations are compromised’, the President remained silent.

Records do not show any clear or decisive instruction from the President to take into consideration the ongoing peace process with the MILF as well as the role of the peace process mechanism in Oplan Exodus.