Corona Spinea: The Supreme Court and its crown of thorns

Since Emperor Augustus, the crown had become imperial regalia that symbolized the highest power. But the plaited crown of thorns represented the opposite. To the early Romans, the Corona Spinea signified a perversion of power and authority. Rather than bestow supremacy and prerogative, when forcibly crowned, it was a brutal instrument of mockery and pain.   The Corona Spinea is one of the cruelest instruments of the Passion along with the Roman flagrum, the spear of Longinus, and the nails and the cross. Applied in the controversies now surrounding the Supreme Court (SC) and its highest officer, as symbolic parody, there can perhaps be no other more pregnant with interpretations.   Somewhere in this controversy, as certain as there is mockery there is indeed a perversion of power.   More profound than any contained within a few inches of column space, reading into its symbolism certainly takes more than the time it takes to study the consequences of an eight-count political impeachment complaint or even a cursory viewing of its annotated Power Point version.   Worse, it becomes doubly-difficult to shed the political perspective. More than those that involve any other official subject to impeachment, this is especially important when it involves the Supreme Court.   Of the tripartite branches of government, it is in the Judiciary where there has been extraordinary effort to expunge the political DNA. Unlike the Executive and Legislative branches that are allowed politicians, in the Judiciary, politics is only allowed at the appointment stage and then again only when justices are held accountable via impeachment. Between appointment and accountability, there should be no politicization whatsoever.   It is under such parameters that we analyze recent events and the crown of thorns symbolically set upon the SC’s highest magistrate.   In a multiple-member court, bias is not an impeachable offense following vicarious references to the impeachment of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Samuel W. Chase in 1805.   Nominated by George Washington in 1796, after claiming exclusive judicial review powers and coining the term “Mobocracy”, pertaining to “mob” rule, and applying it to certain policies under Thomas Jefferson, Chase earned the latter’s ire. Citing seditious criticism and claiming Chase lacked objectivity, Jefferson instructed congress to impeach the Chief Justice.  Like a distant mirror, the core of the allegations was misconduct and political bias.   However, on March 1, 1805, Chief Justice Chase was acquitted of all charges.   In 1992, in his book Grand Inquests, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that despite the political nature of an impeachment, the U.S. Senate trying Chase overwhelmingly declined to convict because “the mere quality of his judging was not grounds for removal.” Effectively ruling that bias and partiality are not impeachable offenses, Chase was let off the hook.   In the impeachment complaint now confronting us, there are accusations that are neither convoluted nor complicated by issues involving collegial decision-making, bias or partiality. In these, there is neither shared accountability nor the balancing-out of bias as in Chase’s impeachment. Moreover, while an impeachment is a political exercise, these need not be judged using political benchmarks.   Article II of the impeachment complaint states that the “Respondent  committed  culpable  violation  of  the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) as required under Sec. 17,  Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.” Article III further states that “respondent committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayed the public trust by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that [a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence in …creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office…” Personal misconduct remains a valid charge where these involve corruption. Among the few level-headed, veteran lawmaker Rep. Crispin Remulla astutely pointed out that in at least one among the charges, the Chief Justice is indictable. Article II is not about disclosing the SALN alone. Filing and disclosing are simply matters of record. Article II is about accusations of ill-gotten wealth. It is about undue remunerations and rewards that affect judicial independence. In that, Article II is related to Article III. According to Remulla the decision to allow a spouse to receive favors from a sitting President shows conflict of interest."Any person in that position should never allow any member of his family to accept a position in government.” Because these do not involve the institution but focus on individual conduct, former Rep. Risa Hontiveros is correct in saying that this impeachment, rather than destroys democracy, strengthens it. And if through these alone there is proof of insidious relationships that damage judicial institutions then indeed should we not cry “Crucifige Eum”?