Why PNoy should help abolish political dynasties

 

Recently, I had the privilege of joining a lively panel discussion on political dynasties in the Philippines -- assessing their impact on poverty and inequality in the country. Interestingly, one of my co-panelists was Congressman Fred Castro, chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, who passionately shared his advocacy for loosening the grip of political families on our state institutions.

 

Naturally, we awaited his assessment on whether there is any chance to pass the Anti-Dynasty bill under the present Congress -- or in the near future, for that matter. The bill recently managed to garner swift support in Castro’s committee, and essentially seeks to prohibit relatives up to the second degree of consanguinity to run for or occupy national and local posts in simultaneous, overlapping, or successive terms. Barangay officials, meanwhile, are exempted.

 

There is nothing revolutionary about the bill itself, since our Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 26) mandates that “the state shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” What makes the bill encouraging, though, is how it seeks to operationalize the concept of political dynasty -- and, accordingly, introduce restrictions on its proliferation to open up our elected institutions to genuine competition.

 

But it is far from assured whether the bill will survive the expected onslaught during the scheduled plenary deliberations, where many amendments will most likely be introduced. With the Aquino administration refusing to designate the bill as priority legislation, the recently-gained momentum could vanish into thin air. 

 

Many continue to hope that PNoy -- who hails from one of the country’s oldest political families -- will demonstrate his commitment to his good governance initiatives by supporting measures that facilitate the democratic contestation of political power.

 

The perils of crony capitalism

 

One way of looking at political dynasties in the Philippines is by way of comparative analysis. From Mexico to Indonesia and Pakistan, political dynasties have been a common feature of democratic elections, and certain family names never fail to successively reappear on the ballot.

 

There are a number of (inter-related) reasons for the proliferation of political dynasties across the developing world, especially in Asia. One has to do with the colonial legacy, where the former Western powers ensured a cost-efficient domination of Eastern societies by co-opting the local elite, with India and the Philippines as a potent expression of this strategy.

 

In this way, the colonial powers didn't need to engage in the arduous, risky, and unsustainable enterprise of state-building and full-scale military occupation. All they needed to do was to retain the compliance of their clients by granting them conditional access to vast privileges, while eliminating the unruly ones through the deployment of coercive mechanisms. 

 

The national independence process largely cemented the grip of old elites by ensuring their dominance in critical pillars of the economy as well as parliamentary institutions. Once the post-independence national development process kicked-off, the same set of elite was in a highly advantageous position to shape and benefit from domestic capitalist expansion.

 

No wonder, crony capitalism is a common feature among most developing countries. Half-hearted attempts at reform and revolution either failed or mainly benefited the rival, emerging elite factions, who used autocratic policies to sideline the old elite. Only few developing countries such as South Korea and Taiwan were able to break out of this vicious cycle, thanks to a robust process of industrialization and genuine land reform, which helped establish a vibrant middle class as the backbone of democracy.

 

After the colossal failure of many state-dominated autocratic societies, what followed was an aggressive process of market liberalization, which did little to improve the situation, with formerly egalitarian societies such as China swiftly becoming among the most unequal on earth. In the Philippines, critical sectors of the economy, including public services, were handed to the old elite, while the newly-generated growth was far from inclusive.

 

Uniquely common

 

What sets apart the Philippines from many neighboring countries is the magnitude of the concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of a few, mostly from the old elite. The top 40 richest families control up to 76 percent of the Philippine economy, the highest rate of “wealth concentration” in Asia, and about 178 political dynasties have managed to dominate 73 out of a total of 80 provinces.

 

As many authoritative studies suggest, there is no straightforward causal relationship in the Philippines between political dynasties, on one hand, and poverty and inequality, on the other. For me, all of them are a reflection of a deeper problem, namely the absence of an autonomous, developmental state, which has its roots in the faulty nation-state-formation process in the early 20th century. Besides, there are also benign political dynasties.

 

But there is a significant correlation between the frequency of political dynasties and the incidence of poverty and massive inequality. To put it simply, they reinforce each other. In many ways, elected and appointed offices have become an instrument for preventing structural reform, maintaining the status quo, and concentrating economic gains in the hands of the privileged classes.

 

The greatest criticism against the proliferation of political dynasties, however, is how such a phenomenon violates the principles of equal access and democratic competition in the country, where one’s election to political office becomes increasingly a function of family brand and patronage. 

 

 

Richard Javad Heydarian teaches International Political Economy at Ateneo De Manila University (ADMU) and is a columnist for Huffington Post and Asia Times. He is the author of "How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings" (Zed, London). He can be reached at jrheydarian@gmail.com