Reviewing the basics

Soon after the hearing before the Senate Electoral Tribunal several heavyweights weighed in.  Lightweights also chimed in. What we now have is a cacophony of allusions to customary international law, constitutional law -- and an ample serving of ad hominems and ad misericordiams to boot.  I thought it useful to lay down some basic propositions to which we might all return in taking up this intriguing but important subject.

Proposition 1: It is true that what is presently litigated before the Senate Electoral Tribunal is her eligibility for the position she now holds -- Senator of the Republic.  BUT, since the grounds advanced by the petitioner for her disqualification are "nationality" and "residence," then whatever the SET may rule -- and eventually the Supreme Court, should the matter be elevated by the appropriate avenue -- bear upon her announced candidacy for the office of President.

Proposition 2: Grace Poe is a "foundling," which simply means, in law, one found in a jurisdiction, of unknown parents and parentage. Her age puts her birth within the effectivity of the Constitution of 1935. Under that Constitution, one had to be born of a Filipino father (whether legitimately or illegitimately is irrelevant) to be considered a natural-born Filipino. If one was born of a Filipino mother and a foreigner father, one had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.  Those who elect Filipino citizenship are deemed natural-born.  (Co v. HRET, 1991)

Proposition 3: There is no express provision of Philippine law that allows us to attribute to a foundling Philippine citizenship, if the finding takes place in the Philippines. Neither is there a provision in any treaty to which the Philippines is a party that binds the Philippines to attribute its nationality to all foundlings found within its jurisdiction.

Proposition 4: Grace Poe enjoys the presumption that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen as a logical and juridical corollary of the presumption that she holds office regularly, an office that requires the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen. The burden of proving alienage is therefore on whoever assails her status. It is not for her to prove that she is natural-born.

Proposition 5:  A natural-born Filipino who subsequently acquires alien nationality by naturalization, and then re-acquires Philippine citizenship is deemed a natural-born Filipino. Although required to formally renounce alien status and swear allegiance to the Philippines, it is doctrinally held that such a person merely returns to the natural-born status he had before he lost it.

Proposition 6: While it is a principle of municipal law that the State may not be held in estoppel, it is likewise a principle of international law that a State can be held to its representation and to its acts.  The Philippines issued her a Philippine passport therein certifying her nationality as "Filipino." This is a juridically relevant fact, from the vantage point of international law.

Proposition 7: In contemporary international law, in cases where nationality is disputed, the doctrine of "effective nationality" or "effective links" is widely accepted. This was the doctrine upheld in the Nottebohm case. Where nationality is contested, a person is to be considered a national of that state with which he or she has the most effective, real and actual links.

Proposition 8:  The use of a foreign passport by one who regains Philippine nationality IS NOT irrelevant.  "It repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position." (Maquiling v. COMELEC, 2013).

Proposition 9: All Filipinos who acquire foreign nationality and later subsequently re-acquire Philippine citizenship and required to renounce all foreign citizenships and to execute a personal and sworn renunciation to qualify for ANY public office.  This is an express requirement of Republic Act No. 9225.  It applies to all who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship, whether as dual citizens or not, and is a necessary condition for election to public office. (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 2012)

From what I take to be currently indubitable propositions -- either as a matter of legal hermeneutics or as a result of the present state of international or domestic law, it will be interesting to see what binding conclusions are drawn from these.

Fr. Ranhilio Callangan Aquino is the dean of the San Beda Graduate School of Law.


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