10 reasons why electricity bills are high
After MERALCO, the countryâs largest electricity distributor and supplier, announced last April an increase in its generation charges by 51.88 centavos per kilowatt hour (kWh), rumors of a brewing government takeover began spreading like wildfire. Signals are there, experts say, as shares of both the government and the Lopezes each jumped to more than 30%, with the Lopezes having a slight fractional advantage. The recent government actions to pin down MERALCO and target the Lopezes, however, only serve to narrow the discourse to a simplistic formula: Electricity rates are high; for which MERALCO and the Lopezes are to blame. Meralco is no doubt an easy and guilty target. But there are more reasons for electricity rates in the Philippines being among the highest in Asia. And the Arroyo government is equally to blame, if not more. The Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) believes that the issue of high electricity prices is a result of a confluence of factors, from bad governance to corruption to mismanagement to rent-seeking to framework concerns. It is also more complex than what media portrays or what some politicians would want us to believe. We attempt to identify these factors as our contribution to gaining a fuller understanding of the problem of unabated expensive electricity. The FDC argues that the skyrocketing price of electricity emanates from structural, management, policy, governance and paradigmatic causes. The FDC believes that these problems cannot be resolved fully without transforming the electricity industry into one that is more responsive and accountable to the people, and more environmentally sustainable. Meanwhile, it would greatly help the consumer for the government to target specific rate-hiking factors and introduce immediate reforms, with the end-in-view of course, of more comprehensive changes sooner rather than later. We believe electricity is expensive because of the following:
- 1. The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) allows MERALCO, other distribution utilities (DUs) and the National Transmission Commission (Transco) to earn over and above what used to be the statutory return on rate base of 8-12%. The Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) allowed ERC to change the system of tariff setting, and it did. But the systems it now follows allows both transmission and distribution companies to earn far more than what they were allowed to earn in the past. And as far as generation and supply companies are concerned, the ERC has little if any say in the prices they charge because generation and supply are deregulated under EPIRA. 2. The Arroyo government wants to attract private investors to purchase NPCâs assets, and for the assets to become attractive, electricity rates have to be high. The higher the winning bidder bids, the higher the electricity price we have to pay in the future so the winning bidder can recover its investment. This can be observed with the nature of recent electricity rate hikes. Following the suggestion of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the National Power Corporation (NPC) petitioned rate hikes in order to attract investors since no investor would invest without proof of financial viability. Out of the PhP1.98/kWh NPC petitioned in 2004, PhP1.03/kWh was approved by ERC in 2005 â the highest rate hike in the history of the ERC. Transmission charges also increased from PhP0.7716/kWh in May 2006 to PhP0.9163/kWh in July 2006 (which is contrasted with almost flat prices from November 2005 up to May 2006) as the privatization and the bidding process is about to start. 3. The Arroyo government did not renegotiate the contracts with NPCâs independent power producers or IPPs. These contracts require NPC to purchase electricity whether or not these are actually generated or dispatched, and to supply fuel to IPPs that are in operation. The price NPC agreed to pay for this electricity was overstated to begin with, and many of these contracts have clauses that allow the IPP to raise rates over time. NPC also bears the risk of peso devaluation and the risk of the cost of fuel, such as oil and coal, going up. We have been paying for these contracts in our electric bills for over a decade, and we continue to pay for these today, although this is less transparent, thanks to unbundling. With world oil and coal prices hitting all time highs, with the peso now at PhP40 to the dollar compared with PhP26:$1 when these contracts were signed, the cost of these contracts are an excessive burden on ordinary Filipino electricity consumers. Even consumers that do not have electricity at home are also made to pay for these contracts because the government guarantees all of NPCâs obligations to the IPPs. 4. EPIRA allows MERALCO to purchase at most half of its electricity requirements from its sister companies or IPPs. Besides the problem of NPC with the IPPs, we have the problem of MERALCOâs contracts directly with its own IPPs. EPIRA also allows cross ownership between generation and distribution. A closer look at the ownership of most of MERALCOâs IPPs will show that they are owned by the Lopezes. Examples include the Santa Rita, the San Lorenzo Natural Gas, and the Quezon Coal-fired Power Plants. Whatever guarantees the government gives to its IPPs, MERALCO also gives to its IPPs. MERALCO has always claimed that it doesnât earn from the high generation charges of its IPPs, and that it is merely passing on to its IPPs whatever it charges its customers for generation. MERALCO is telling the truth. But that is not the entire picture. For while MERALCO doesnât itself earn from the high generation charges of its IPPs, the Lopezes do. A simple review of the financial statements of the Lopez holding company and its generation companies will show this. This results to a clear case of double-whammy for the consumers. At one end, NPC must still pay for the unsold electricity it gets from IPPs because of the take-or-pay provision â an undue costs which will later be part of NPCâs stranded cost to be passed on later to the consumers. At the other end, MERALCO pays its IPPs more than what it would have paid NPC, if it bought the electricity from NPC during the same hours that MERALCO was buying from its IPPs. As NPC rates vary from hour to hour, becoming more expensive when demand for electricity peaks, we must compare on an hourly basis what MERALCO pays its IPPs with what it would have paid NPC if it bought electricity from NPC instead of its IPPs. Fortunately during the May 6, 2008 dialog at the ERC, members of FDC and EmPower Consumers were able to obtain a copy of Meralcoâs electricity suppliers and their respective cost and share for the months of March and April. Data shows that the cost of power from Meralcoâs IPPs is higher than that of NPCâs.

- ⢠In 2002, ERC discovered PhP0.50/kWh unjustified over-recoveries of MERALCO from the PPA. It reached PhP12.3 billion as based in December 2001 computations. MERALCO was asked to refund it to the consumers. ⢠In 2003, the Commission on Audit discovered that MERALCO overcharged its customers by PhP0.017/kWh through inclusion of income tax as operation expense which it passed on to consumers from 1994 to 2002. The Supreme Court subsequently ordered MERALCO to stop this practice and to refund the consumers by as much as PhP30 billion. ⢠Also in 2003, FDC questioned ERCâs giving of provisional authority to MERALCO to raise their rates by as much as PhP0.12/kWh. Fortunately for the consumers, the Supreme Court junked the ERC decision in January 2004 because it violated certain rules during its own hearings. ⢠In June 2004, MERALCO again applied for PhP0.1327/kWh increase through Generation Rate Adjustment Mechanism (GRAM). The Supreme Court again junked the petition in February 2006 as MERALCO did not follow the prescribed process (lack of hearing and publication).
- ⢠In NPC. Corruption in National Power Corporation (NPC) artificially inflates generation charges. This includes allegations of âoverpricing" in the process of buying coal and oil supply for NPC-owned power plants and NPC-IPPâs. ⢠In PSALM. The privatization of NPC plants is anomaly-ridden, the most outstanding proof of which is the halted sale of the Masinloc Power Plant to the winning bidder â the YNN. Aside from the fact that YNN capacity is questionable (it failed to pay down payment despite three extensions), sale of Masinloc to YNN will only raise electricity prices form PhP2.80 to PhP4.80/kWh. What is more revolting is this case is that, according to a COA report, PSALM officials gave themselves PhP10-million bonus because of the âsuccessful" closing of the failed transaction with YNN. - Freedom from Debt Coalition