Could Marcos have been a Lee Kuan Yew?

Before we leave the debate on whether Ferdinand Marcos could have developed the Philippines into another Singapore, let us look at the issue from the perspective of an academic’s study in 2005 that probed into leadership styles in developing economies and how these are shaped eventually by the size of economic resources the leaders can muster. The dictator’s son, Bongbong who last year was elected to the Senate, commented to journalists last week at the height of the celebrations marking the 25th year of the Edsa People Power Revolt that his dad would have lifted the country’s development into “another Singapore” had not the popular uprising ousted the elder Marcos from the presidency. Bongbong said that when his father was in power his government “had plans” for the country’s development into an advanced economy. Of course, the rest of the Filipino people know by now how Marcos had mismanaged the Philippine economy and millions of families to the poorhouse. By the end of his dictatorial rule, the Philippines was already overtaken by all of its neighbors in Southeast Asia—whereas it was the second most dynamic economy in all of Asia when he first assumed power in 1966. The claim that Marcos could have developed the Philippines into another Singapore is therefore pure hogwash. Yes, we too saw many of those Marcos development plans Bongbong cited—they were presented to international financing institutions for dollar assistance that eventually poured into Marcos bank deposits abroad. The study by Dr. Hilton Root, a policy specialist in international political economy and development at the Milken Institute of California, probed into the leadership styles of Ferdinand Marcos and Lee Kuan Yew in light of resources at their disposal. What the 2005 study came up with should help enlighten Bongbong on this governance issue, given that he seems to be aiming for loftier political goals in the future. Root’s study, titled “Political Virtue and Economic Leadership: A Southeast Asian Paradox”, concluded that “the availability of resources for distribution as patronage can influence a leader’s choice between rule through good governance and rule through mismanagement.” The Root paper said that leaders, in order to maintain control in any political system, must offer their supporters better benefits than political challengers can credibly commit to providing. “Where the population is large relative to the number of supporters needed by the ruler to stay in power,” it added, “he/she can direct more resources toward supporters in the form of private benefits.” That was apparently the explanation for the perpetration of patronage and economic largesse as the key claim to leadership during the Marcos rule, especially during the years he placed under martial law and governed singlehandedly by decree. Root also said: “Only where the surplus available for corruption is small must leaders concentrate on implementing good policies that benefit the population as a whole. Necessity rather than innate virtue explains the decision to provide good public policy.” Singapore, which LKY nurtured from a new state that separated from the Malaya federation in 1965 with no large amounts of assets or natural resources to distribute to key followers, is today a bustling economy that enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in Asia. With no political handouts that he could put together to buy loyalty from politicians and constituents whose support he obviously needed, Lee erected a system anchored on “corruption-free governance, sobriety, and economic growth.” In 1966, when Bongbong was barely nine years old, Marcos first assumed the presidency. Back then the Philippines was a world leader in the production and export of such mineral products like gold, silver, copper, along with agricultural commodities like coconut and sugar. And to think that Marcos was, in the early years of his rule, an advocate of “private sector-led growth with social inclusiveness and strong governmental guidance.” “The requirements of survival and growth must rely upon a strong executive,” Marcos would often proclaim at the time. “Only with real authority may he [the leader] expect to lead an effective government…balancing strong authority and the requirements of the public welfare.” (Doesn’t that remind you of somebody else’s “strong republic” credo?) In actual deeds, Marcos distributed management of the leading industries to his favored allies and relatives, and expanded the list of such industries under the control of Marcos allies—later to be referred to in history books as the “cronies” of the dictatorship’s “kleptocracy.” The big contrast in the leadership styles of Marcos and Lee, according to Root, was shown in this state of economic development: “Ferdinand Marcos impoverished his country while acquiring wealth unsurpassed by fellow citizens. By contrast, Lee Kuan Yew created great prosperity for Singapore’s citizens while living solely on his salary as chief executive.” Viewing economies of scale in government, Root noted that population size is one factor that plays an important role in determining how much wealth can be extracted for redistribution. “All countries require a minimum number of people and resources to provide essential government functions such as analyzing and implementing policy, maintaining order, filling overseas embassies, jailing thieves and providing national defense. Holding per capita tax receipts constant, the absolute minimum fixed cost of government will comprise a larger portion of expenditures in a small country – hence the presence of economies of scale.” On the other hand, Root said: “As we consider smaller countries, the proportion of total GDP required to cover the fixed cost of government administration rises. Thus, relative to countries with large populations, small countries cannot afford to misuse resources.” Apparently, Marcos was not alone in that kind of doomed leadership style. The Marcos regime channeled huge sums of foreign aid to such projects as a film center, cultural center, and the Ali-Frazier bout, “Thrilla in Manila.” This was the dictatorship’s way of entertaining its people as they suffered in poverty. Elsewhere in the developing world, the Congo’s Mobutu also entertained his impoverished people by spending on a similar Ali-Foreman match. Root pointed out that Mobutu, as in the case of the Philippine leader, “did not have to pay the price for his self-indulgence because disorder in the country’s management system allowed him to finance pet projects by siphoning off funds from the nation’s development budget.” Clearly then, Marcos could have not been able to lead his country into becoming another Singapore. Root, incidentally, was in the Philippines in the 1990s as a panelist in a symposium on “Rx: Good Governance” hosted by Philexport. The only other member of that panel was Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, at the time a member of the Senate. Some highly placed officials could have learned from him. If they had heeded lessons from Root’s words on good governance, maybe the Philippines could have developed into “another Singapore” even after Marcos. Sayang.