Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago’s nationally televised berating of public officials and private citizens can be—in some eyes—a spectacle to behold. With polysyllabic words polished sharp, she deftly uses the Queen’s imperious language to compel the objects of her ire to mend their errant ways. One may be in awe of the lady Senator from Iloilo as a mere observer, but should you be at the receiving end of her tongue-lashing, star-struck you may no longer be. Veteran lawyer Vitaliano Aguirre II, retained as private counsel by the House of Representatives’ panel prosecuting impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona, has found that very experience contemptible indeed. For the first time in his 40 years of practice, Aguirre bowed in apparent anguish for he had to put up with a judge loudly lecturing at lawyers in open court. But by placing his cupped hands over his “hurt ears” while in full view of cameras, he might as well have raised his fists in open defiance. Minutes after Aguirre’s verbal tussle with Santiago on Day 26 of the impeachment trial, Senator-judge Pia Cayetano pointed out that Rule VI of the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials (Senate Impeachment Rules) allows the revised Rules of Court – which applies to the judiciary in general – to supplement the Senate Impeachment Rules whenever applicable. Cayetano then cited Rule 71 of the Rules of Court – in relation Senate Impeachment Rule V on punishing “in a summary way contempts” to the Senate’s authority – prescribing the penalty of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding ten days on any person guilty of direct contempt for misbehavior or disrespect toward the court. Aguirre became the first person cited in contempt by the Senate sitting as an impeachment court. His sentence would be discussed in the Senate caucus on Monday, March 5. Ancient legal precept: ‘Give everyone his due’ The House prosecution panel has apologized for Aguirre’s act of disrespect. Aguirre himself has apologized for the “hurt feelings” that cupping his “hurt ears” might have caused to the senators; but he still refuses to repent for having done the deed. Aguirre thanked the presiding officer, Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, for allowing him to explain his actions in open court. But upon speaking, Aguirre lectured back to the lecturing legislator, telling Santiago, “If you demand respect, respect also these lawyers because human dignity has no equal.” Well and good. But being right and doing right are two different things. One can be right and yet do the wrong thing; conversely, one can be wrong, but do the right thing. In the end, doing right is more important than being right. At least to his credit, it appears that he won’t shirk and will face up and take as a man his just deserts, which is quite honorable.
Privilege speech: 'Spit on the face of the Chief Justice'
The Internet has made Philippine jurisprudence practically commonplace and the Supreme Court’s decision in Pobre vs. Defensor- Santiago (A.C. 7399, 25 August 2009) spread throughout social media merely hours after Aguirre got cited in contempt for his misbehavior and for answering back to Senator-judge Santiago. In December 2005, the high court’s attention was called to Santiago’s intemperate words in her privilege speech at the Senate: “…I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots...” The Supreme Court dismissed the case against Santiago because she enjoys parliamentary immunity under the Constitution. But the court hastened “to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice,” adding that “the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.” “To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities,” said the high court.
An example would be made of him, possibly because he committed the misdeed on the day the latest and largest batch of lawyers-to-be were announced. Apparently, the future lawyers closely follow the trial. The Bar topnotcher has confessed that he finds
Corona’s trial “inspiring”. Ancient Rome’s jurisprudent Paulus said: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” These very words have, in fact, been codified in Article 19 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, the first article under the chapter on “Human Relations” and forever etched in the minds and hearts of every student of the law and member of the legal profession.
Codes: Judicial conduct, lawyers’ profession Section 20(b) 0f Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enforces the duty of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due to judicial officers. But the Rules of Court, as well as the Senate Impeachment Rules, deal primarily with the conduct of trial. The conduct of court officials, on the other hand, is largely governed by two codes of conduct – one for judges and the other for lawyers – which unfortunately during the Santiago-Aquirre incident seemed to clash with each other when, in reality, they complement one another. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) lays down the duties all lawyers owe to society in general, to the legal profession, to the courts in which they appear, and to their clients – in that order of importance. Both Santiago and Aguirre are lawyers, thus the CPR applies to them. Top-shelf in this hierarchy of duties is the expectation that all lawyers would promote the public interest and uphold the solemn ideals of the legal profession. Immediately outranking service to clients, lawyers must first uphold the integrity of the courts. Canon 11 of the CPR requires of all lawyers to “observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.” Reuben Agpalo, in his seminal legal treatise on the CPR, wrote “For if a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm. It does not mean, however, that the lawyer should answer back in kind.”
No objections vs. Senator-judges
Senator Jinggoy Estrada, the first to call the Senate’s attention to Aguirre’s act of “disrespect”, asked the lawyer why he did not instead object to Santiago’s statements as she was making them in open court. Aguirre’s answer: under the Senate Impeachment Rules, we cannot object to anything a senator-judge says. Notably all throughout the impeachment trial, Corona’s lead defense counsel and retired SC Justice Serafin Cuevas has also been harping all along that no one can object to the “clarificatory questions” asked, or manifestations made, by senator-judges whom he said “sometimes acted like prosecutors.” Senate Impeachment Rule XIV requires the prosecutors and defense counsel to address only the presiding officer as regards all their objections on procedure, trial or other questions arising during the trial. Thus, the lawyers on either side cannot object to questions asked by senator-judges under Rule XVII, whether directed to witnesses or the lawyers themselves. Former Senator Francisco Tatad, in his opinion column, has criticized this “no objection” provision in the present Senate Impeachment Rules. He recounted having “presided over the writing of those rules” for the impeachment trial of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in November 2000. Tatad said the senator-judges “tried to copy faithfully the [impeachment] rules of the [United States] Senate” which had not undergone any major change since they were first written in 1868. He said he had wanted to retain in its totality US Senate Impeachment Rule XIX: “If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, or to a manager [prosecutor], or to counsel of the person impeached, …it shall be reduced in writing, and put to the Presiding Officer. The parties may interpose objections to witnesses answering questions propounded at the request of any Senator and the merits of any such objection may be argued by the parties or their counsel…” But Tatad said some senator-judges demanded to be allowed to ask their questions orally, instead of merely passing on their questions to the presiding officer in written notes. More importantly, he said the Philippine Senate Impeachment Rules during his time “also retained the right of the parties, through counsel, to object to any question being asked by a senator-judge.” In contrast, Senate Resolution No. 39 which was adopted in March 2011 has deleted from the present Senate Impeachment Rules the right of counsel to object to questions propounded by senator-judges. In Tatad’s view, “not allowing him [counsel] to do so clearly violates the Constitution.”
Santiago is an elected legislator but she is also a retired judge who would soon sit in the International Criminal Court. As such, the old Code of Judicial Conduct must already have woven itself into the moral fiber of her being – including Rule 3.04 which states that: “A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.”
Benchbook: ‘Manual’ for judges In May 2007, the Supreme Court in
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955 admonished a judge to “maintain composure and equanimity” and “always be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language” because “as a dispenser of justice” a judge “should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language.” The high court said “a judge, even on the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.” To guide judges who “sit on the Bench” – that is, who occupy positions in trial courts and appellate courts – the Supreme Court came up with a handy Benchbook which drew on established jurisprudence. The Benchbook cautions judges to “keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his subordinates” and “take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct." “He may penalize lawyers and court personnel for contempt in the appropriate cases to enforce discipline on them. But it should be remembered that ‘judges should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation, not for retaliation or vindication’.” Three days after the incident, Santiago
herself affirmed the Supreme Court has ruled that the power to cite for contempt was not vindictive but “corrective” in nature, adding that the issue was nothing personal. The Benchbook also intones: “Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly, and the judge himself should set the example and the tone.” It goes on to say: “A judge should not allow himself to be moved by pride, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties. ...An over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. ‘A judge, mindful of his high calling and his mission, should refrain from the use of inflammatory and excessive rhetoric’.”
— ELR, GMA News